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Abstract
Exporters continuously enter and exit individual foreign markets. Although a given firm’s
status as an exporter tends to be persistent, the set of destination countries that a firm serves
changes frequently. In this paper we empirically examine the determinants of a firm’s choice of
destination countries and show that their export paths follow systematic patterns. We develop
a model of export dynamics where firms decide in each period the countries to which they sell.
Our model allows profits from each possible destination country to depend on: (a) how similar
it is to the firm’s home country (gravity), and (b) how similar it is to other destinations to
which the firm has previously exported (extended gravity). Given the enormous number of
possible export paths from which firms may choose, conventional estimation approaches based
on discrete choice models are unfeasible. Instead, we use a moment inequalities approach.
Our inequalities come from applying an analogue of Euler’s perturbation method to a discrete
choice setting. We show that standard gravity forces have a much larger influence on sunk
costs than on fixed costs of exporting and that extended gravity effects can be substantial.
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1 Introduction
Exporters continuously enter and exit individual foreign markets. Although a given firm’s
status as an exporter is persistent, the specific set of countries that a firm serves changes
frequently. These export dynamics generate economy-wide productivity fluctuations in the
exporting countries through intra-industry resource re-allocations (Pavcnik (2002), Melitz
(2003)) and within firm productivity growth coming from learning by exporting (Van Biese-
broeck (2005), De Loecker (2007), Lileeva and Trefler (2010)). The entry and exit of firms in
foreign markets also has direct welfare implications for importing countries as they affect the
range of product varieties available for consumption (Broda and Weinstein (2006)). Besides
its welfare implications, the movement of firms in and out of export markets has proved rel-
evant in explaining long-run changes in aggregate trade flows (Evenett and Venables (2002),
Bernard et al. (2009), Lawless (2009)), asymmetric responses to temporary and permanent
changes in expected export profits (Ruhl (2008)), persistent deviations from purchasing power
parity (Ghironi and Melitz (2005)), and variation in stock market returns and earnings yields
(Fillat and Garetto (2010)).
This paper analyzes the determinants of firm entry and exit into foreign markets. We allow
export dynamics in each potential destination country to depend on: (a) similarity between
the importing country and the firm’s home country, and (b) similarity between the current
importing country and prior destinations of the firm’s exports. Therefore, the model borrows
from the most recent gravity equation literature the intuition that firms tend to access first
markets that are larger and geographically and linguistically closer to the country of origin
(e.g. Eaton and Kortum (2002), Helpman et al. (2008)). Besides, we complement this intuition
by allowing export decisions of firms in every time period to also depend on their previous
exporting history. More precisely, this paper introduces the concept of extended gravity as a
new determinant of firm entry into export markets. While gravity reflects closeness between
home and destination markets, extended gravity depends on similarities between two receiving
countries. We quantify how strong gravity and extended gravity effects are in determining
firms’ country-specific entry and exit decisions.
Extended gravity effects reflect the empirical fact (shown in Section 3) that firms are more
likely to enter countries that are similar to other destinations to which they have previously
exported. We can think of the startup costs that firms face when entering a new country
as adaptation costs. Extended gravity indicates that some firms are better prepared than
others to export to certain countries precisely because they have been previously serving
similar markets and therefore have already completed part of the costly adaptation process.
This process may imply modifications to the offered product in order to customize it to the
particular local tastes or legal requirements imposed by national consumer protection laws
(e.g. writing instruction manuals and labeling the product in the local language). Additional
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sources of adaptation costs may be time spent in looking for a distributor, or wages paid to
newly-hired workers with specific skills (e.g. language skills). Given that adaptation costs
are likely to be higher the more different the destination market is from the home country,
extended gravity effects are potentially more significant in countries that are far away and
particularly different from the country of origin.
We embed gravity and extended gravity effects in a multi-period, multi-country generaliza-
tion of Melitz (2003). Firms are monopolistic competitors and face a CES demand function in
every market. They take their entry and exit decisions dynamically, and expectational errors
are accounted for. In order to incorporate gravity, we allow trade costs to vary depending
on whether each of the destinations shares its continent or language, or has similar GDP per
capita, with the firm’s home country. Extended gravity is assumed to affect only entry costs.
This is consistent with the interpretation of extended gravity as related to how costly it is for
a firm to adapt itself to a new country. Once a firm is already serving a particular market,
all the adaptation costs must have already been incurred and no additional advantage is ob-
tained from exporting to other destination countries. The extended gravity variables included
in the model are firm-country-year specific. We use four dummies to reflect common border,
continent, or official language, or having similar GDP per capita, with a country to which the
firm was exporting in the previous year.
In the estimation of our model, we use a data set that contains information on exports
for the Chilean manufacturing sector during the period of 1995 to 2005. We use firm-level
matched information both on export flows disaggregated by country and year (provided by
the Chilean Customs Agency) and on some characteristics of the production function of the
corresponding firm (taken from the Chilean Annual Industrial Survey).
The traditional approach to the structural estimation of models of entry relies on deriving
choice probabilities from the theoretical framework, and choosing the parameter values that
maximize the likelihood of the entry choices observed in the data (e.g. see Das et al. (2007)).
This approach is not feasible in our setting. Writing the choice probabilities involves examin-
ing the dynamic implications of every possible combination of export destinations. Given the
cardinality of the choice set (for a given number of countries N , the choice set includes 2N ele-
ments), computing the value function corresponding to each of its elements is impossible with
currently available computational capabilities. We avoid this complication by using moment
inequalities as our estimation method. In our setting, moment inequality estimators require
neither computing the value function of the firm nor artificially reducing the dimensionality
of the choice set. A consequence of applying moment inequalities is that identification will
typically be partial, that is, there may be a set of points satisfying the moment inequalities
rather than just a single point.
Our inequalities come from applying an analogue of Euler’s perturbation method to our
dynamic discrete choice problem. Specifically, we impose only one-period deviations on the
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observed export path for each firm. Contrary to multiple-period deviations, one-period devi-
ations are compatible with obtaining consistent estimates for the parameters even if expecta-
tional errors on the part of the agents are allowed.
We estimate our model for the manufacturing sector of chemicals and chemical products
(sector 24 according to 2-digit ISIC rev.3.1). The results show that standard gravity variables
have a significant effect on trade costs. The startup costs for a Chilean firm entering a country
that is in South America, in which Spanish is predominantly spoken and that has similar GDP
per capita to Chile (e.g. Colombia) are estimated to be between 277, 303 USD and 313, 216
USD.1 These costs increase significantly when the destination country is not located in South
America (e.g. the entering costs for Spain are estimated to be between 347, 549 USD and
429, 675 USD). The increase coming from the destination country not having Spanish as
official language is smaller (e.g. the estimated interval for Brazil is 283, 323 USD to 421, 640
USD). Finally, when a country differs from Chile in all three gravity variables included in the
model, the estimated interval increases further and becomes 387, 527 USD to 538, 986 USD.
Concerning the extended gravity variables, language is the only one which is estimated to
significantly reduce the cost of accessing a new country: previously serving a market that
has the same official language as the destination country reduces country-specific entry costs
between 19 and 28 percent.
The spatial dependence in export entry and exit generated by extended gravity effects has
important implications for the interpretation of the gravity equation parameters as well as for
trade policy.
Since Tinbergen (1962) pioneered the use of gravity equations to study bilateral trade
flows, his specification has been widely used. A defining characteristic of the gravity equation
introduced by Tinbergen (1962) is that trade flows between two countries are predicted to
depend exclusively on some index of their economic size and measures of trade resistance
between them. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) were the first to take into account the
effect of third countries and introduce a multilateral resistance term in the specification of
an otherwise standard gravity equation. In their model, for a given bilateral barrier between
two countries j and j′, higher geographical barriers between j′ and other countries will raise
imports from j. Extended gravity effects work in the opposite direction. Their existence
makes it beneficial for firms to direct their export activities towards “hub” markets that share
characteristics with a large number of countries. This effect will increase exports to these
countries not only from firms already exporting to connected countries but, in general, from
every firm. Not controlling for this “hubness” variable is likely to result in an upward bias in
the estimates of the effect of bilateral trade barriers.2
1We report here the point estimates for the extrema of the identified set. Confidence intervals are provided
in Section 8. Unless otherwise stated, every quantity included in this paper is evaluated in year 2000 US dollars.
2This is due to the fact that the more distinct a country is from the origin country, the more likely it is that
firms exporting to it benefit from extended gravity effects. Note that the extended gravity effects generated by
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Following the collapse of international trade that began in the last quarter of 2008, gravity
equations have become a popular tool to estimate the elasticity of global trade with respect to
world GDP.3 Omitting the “hubness” variables makes these estimates particularly misleading.
Even under the assumption that the elasticity of bilateral trade with respect to the trade
partner’s GDP is identical across any possible pair of countries, extended gravity effects imply
that it is important to know how changes in global GDP are distributed across markets. A
drop in GDP in a “hub” country, which is connected to many others through extended gravity,
will have a much larger effect on aggregate trade than an equivalent change in a “non-hub”
country that is isolated.
In addition to the consequences of extended gravity for the interpretation of parameters in
gravity equations, the existence of extended gravity connections among the importing countries
also has novel policy implications. Our model implies that reducing trade barriers in a country
increases entry not only in its own market but also in other markets that are connected to it
through extended gravity. This has important implications for import policies, suggesting that
policies in one country will generate externalities for other countries. These externalities unveil
a possible rationale for regional integration agreements, which force countries to internalize
those cross-country effects when setting their legal barriers to trade. Concerning export policy,
whenever there are reasons for export promotion measures, extended gravity points to the
convenience of targeting these to hub countries that share characteristics with the largest
number of foreign markets.
Our paper is related to several strands of the literature. First, our work relates to papers
that structurally estimate fixed and sunk costs of exporting. Das et al. (2007), lacking data on
export flows disaggregated by countries, estimate only general fixed and sunk costs of breaking
into exporting. In contrast, we provide estimates in dollar values for country-specific fixed and
sunk costs of exporting that vary depending on the characteristics of the destination country.
Second, this paper also complements Albornoz et al. (2010), Chaney (2010), and Defever
et al. (2010). The first two provide theoretical mechanisms that generate spatial patterns in
sequential entry. Albornoz et al. (2010) assume firms have imperfect information about their
export profitability, which they discover only after actually engaging in exporting. Assuming
that profitability is correlated over time and across destinations, their model predicts that
firms that have successfully entered some market are more likely to access countries that are
similar to it. In contrast, Chaney (2010) builds a model in which exporters can break into
a market only if they have a contact, and assumes that the probability of a given exporter
acquiring such a contact in a new country is increasing in the aggregate trade flows between the
a given country are different for different countries of origin. Therefore, the standard practice in the gravity
equation literature of introducing country-year dummies is not enough to control for the omitted “hubness”
variable.
3Recent papers that either compute this elasticity or use estimates of it as motivation are: Amiti and
Weinstein (2009), Freund (2009), Grossman and Meissner (2010), and Jacks et al. (2010).
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potential destination country and any other country that the exporter was previously serving.
Furthermore, Albornoz et al. (2010) and Defever et al. (2010) present reduced form evidence
showing that the geographical expansion paths that firms follow depend on their previous
destination markets.4 Our paper contributes to this literature by structurally estimating a
trade model that embeds a mechanism generating sequential entry.
Third, from a methodological point of view, our paper fits in the literature applying
moment inequalities to the estimation of structural models. Like ours, many of these papers
use this method as a way of handling choice sets that are large and complex (e.g. Katz
(2007), Ishii (2008), Ho (2009)). The most closely related paper to ours is Holmes (2010),
which studies Wal-Mart’s store location problem and quantifies the savings in distribution
costs afforded by having a dense network. This paper’s moment inequality estimator relies
on the assumption that Wal-Mart has perfect foresight and employs inequalities based on
multiple-period deviations. In contrast, Pakes et al. (2006) and Pakes (forthcoming) discuss
the possibility of applying an analogue of Euler’s perturbation method to the analysis of single
agent dynamic discrete choice models without imposing perfect foresight. Our paper applies
this approach. We allow agents to have expectational errors and show that only moment
inequalities based on one-period deviations are compatible with consistent estimation in this
setting.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe our data set, which
we use in Section 3 to present reduced form evidence of the basic entry patterns we observe.
Section 4 derives our model of firm entry into different export destinations, and Section 5
provides information on how we can derive moment inequalities from this model. Sections 6
and 7 describe the methods we use to estimate our parameters. Section 8 presents the baseline
results, and Section 9 shows that they are robust to alternative specifications of the moment
inequalities used in the estimation. Section 10 concludes.
2 Data Description
Our data come from two separate sources. The first is an extract of the Chilean customs
database, which covers the universe of exports of Chilean firms from 1995 to 2005. The second
is the Chilean Annual Industrial Survey (Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual, or ENIA), which
includes all manufacturing plants with at least 10 workers for the same years. We merge
these two data sets using firm identifiers, allowing us to exploit information on the export
destinations of each firm and on their domestic activity.5
4Albornoz et al. (2010) uses Argentinean data, and the results in Defever et al. (2010) refer to Chinese
exporters. Although it is not the main focus of their paper, Eaton et al. (2008) shows additional evidence in
the same direction for Colombian exporters.
5We aggregate the information from ENIA across plants in order to obtain firm-level information that
matches the customs data. There are some cases in which firms are identified as exporters in ENIA but do not
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These firms operate in the 19 different 2-digit ISIC sectors that deal with manufacturing.6
We restrict our analysis to one sector: the manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
(sector 24). This is the second largest export manufacturing sector in Chile.7 As Table 1
shows, the volume of exports in the chemicals sector increased by approximately 19 percent
on average during the sample period, and in 2005 it accounted for 17.5 percent of Chile’s
manufacturing exports.
Our data set includes both exporters and non-exporters. Furthermore, in order to minimize
the risk of selection bias in our estimates, we use an unbalanced panel that includes not only
those firms that appear in ENIA in every year between 1995 and 2005 but also those that
were created or disappeared during this period.8
An observation in this data is a firm-country-year combination. For each observation
we have information on the value of goods sold in US dollars. We obtain sales values in
year 2000 terms using the US CPI. Basic summary statistics appear in Table 2. About 68
percent of our firms export at least one year of our sample period. These firms earn average
revenues of over 1,390,000 USD per export market every year and have average domestic
sales of 44,480,000 USD. In comparison, average domestic sales for nonexporters are 1,940,000
USD. Both distributions are nevertheless very skewed. The 75th percentile is in both cases
significantly smaller than the corresponding mean. The average number of export destinations
these firms serve per year is close to 6, and the median number is 4.
We complement our customs-ENIA data with a database of country characteristics. We
obtain information on the primary official language and the names of bordering countries for
each destination market from CEPII.9 We collect data on real GDP, real GDP per capita,
and US dollar nominal exchange rates from the World Bank World Development Indicators.
We use the Wholesale Price Index (or the Producer Price Index in those cases in which the
Wholesale Price Index was not available) and nominal exchange rate data to build a bilateral
real exchange rate index with respect to Chile. The source of the data on price indices is
primarily the World Bank World Development Indicators, and the International Financial
Statistics of the International Monetary Fund for those country-years for which the data was
not available through the World Development Indicators.
have any exports listed with customs. In these cases, we assume that the customs database is more accurate in
this respect and thus label these firms as non-exporters. We lose a number of small firms in the merging process
because, as indicated in the main text, ENIA only covers plants with more than 10 workers. Nevertheless, the
remaining firms account for around 80 percent of total export value.
6ENIA encompasses class D (sectors 15 to 36) of the ISIC rev.3.1 industrial classification.
7The largest export manufacturing sector is food and food products. The estimation results for this sector
are still unavailable. They will be included in a new draft of this paper, which will be posted soon.
8From our sample, we exclude only firms that appear in ENIA less than three years or that appear during
two or more discontinuous periods between 1995 and 2005 (i.e. firms that first disappear and later reappear in
the sample).
9Available at http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm. Mayer and Zignago (2006) provide a
detailed explanation of the content of this database.
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We construct our gravity and extended gravity variables from these country characteristics.
The gravity measures compare Chile with each export destination. We create individual
dummies that indicate if these export destinations share Chile’s language, continent, GDP
per capita category, or borders. We use the World Bank classification of countries into GDP
per capita groups10. The extended gravity variables compare each country to a firm’s previous
export bundle. We have separate dummies for sharing language, continent, GDP per capita
category, and border, with at least one country the firm exported to in the previous year,
and not with Chile itself. More precisely, an extended gravity dummy (e.g. language) for a
given firm-year pair and destination country takes on the value one if it does not share the
corresponding characteristic with Chile (e.g. the destination country does not have Spanish as
official language) but it does share this characteristic with some other country to which the
firm was exporting in the previous year. As an example, Austria would take value of one for
a given firm-year in all the four extended gravity variables if the firm exported to Germany
in the previous period. We use dummy variables rather than continuous differences in order
to simplify the interpretation of our strategy to build moment inequalities.
3 Preliminary Evidence
In this Section, we provide reduced form evidence that supports the choices made in the
specification of the structural model.
First, we consider why it is important to take into account extended gravity alongside
the more conventional gravity forces. Table 3 presents transition matrices differentiating by
extended gravity. The left panel of this table reports the probability that a firm entered a
given country in a given year, conditioned on that firm-country-year observation falling into
one of two groups. The first group contains those observations in which the firm was exporting
in the previous period to a market that shares the corresponding characteristic (continent,
language, GDP per capita group, or border) with the destination country. The second group
includes those observations where the firm was exporting last period but not to any market
that shares the same characteristic with this country. The right hand side of this table reports
the probability that an observation falls into each of these two groups, conditioned on whether
or not it entered that country during the given period11.
10The World Bank classifies countries into four groups (low, lower middle, upper middle and high income)
based on their GDP per capita. The World Bank built these classifications using 2002 income per capita. Low
income is 735 USD or less, lower middle income is 736 USD to 2, 935 USD, upper middle income is 2, 936 USD
to 9, 075 USD and high income is 9, 076 USD or more.
11As an example of how to read Table 3, the probability of entering a given country for a firm that was
exporting in the previous period to some other country in the same continent is 0.035. This probability
decreases to 0.006 if the firm was exporting to countries that do not share continent with that country. At the
same time, the probability that a firm entering a given country was exporting in the previous period to some
destination in the same continent is 0.598.
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If our extended gravity story holds, we expect that membership in the first group, where
the firm exports in the previous period to a destination that shares the corresponding char-
acteristic, raises the probability of entry relative to the case where the firm does not export
to such a destination. This prediction bears out in all the panels of Table 3, since the top
left hand entry is always substantially larger than the entry directly below it. Observations in
which the firm previously exported to a country that shares the corresponding characteristic
also account for a significant portion of the entry events that appear in the data. They are
clearly the majority in all panels except for border and language. This is not surprising given
that most countries share borders and official languages with very few other countries.
Although we argue that these tables support the inclusion of extended gravity in our
model, there are other possible explanations for these findings. For example, imagine a model
where continents are ranked in terms of their proximity to Chile, and firms tend to spread
out gradually to more distant continents (i.e. entry is purely determined by standard gravity
factors). In this case, the fact that a firm is already exporting to a certain continent would
increase the probability that they will soon export to more countries on that continent. But the
relationship would be driven by the distance between Chile and that continent, not between
countries in that continent. However, it is harder for such a story to rationalize the language
and border matrices. The model would have to predict that languages can be ranked by
complexity in such a way that firms would access countries whose official language is up
in the scale only when they have previously accessed the countries with “easier” languages.
In the same way, the border variable in the model would have to generate a pattern where
firms spread outwards from Chile through countries that physically touch each other. Yet,
that conjecture then generates an extended gravity relationship, since it depends on borders
between countries that do not include Chile. This analysis shows how important it is to control
for gravity factors in order to correctly identify extended gravity effects. Our structural model
takes this identification issue into account.
In the structural model we develop in the next sections, we assume that the state vector
of a firm is defined based only on its export status in the previous period. This assumption
implies: (1) extended gravity effects last only for one period; (2) every firm that did not export
to a country in a given period has to pay full entry costs if it exports to it in the next period;
(3) every firm that did not export at all in a given period has to pay the full basic costs of
reentering into the export activity if it exports to any country in the next period.
Table 4 shows that the intensity of the extended gravity effects decreases very fast between
lags one and two. In particular, the probability of entering a country in period t given that the
firm was exporting to some other country that shares a characteristic with it is, on average,
divided by 3 when that export event happened in t− 2 instead of t− 1. In the same way, the
probability of exporting to a country in period t given that the firm was exporting to the same
country in period t− 1 is 0.7745, and it decreases to 0.2173 when we condition on exporting
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to this country in t− 2 and not in t− 1. Finally, the probability of exporting to some country
in t for exporters in period t − 1 is 0.9065 and it decreases to 0.3472 when we condition on
exporting in t−2 and not in period t−1. Therefore, in an extension of the finding in Roberts
and Tybout (1997), not only does the general export persistence decay very fast, but the same
can be said for persistence of exporting to a given country and extended gravity effects.
4 An Empirical Model of Export Entry
In this section, we present a partial equilibrium model where producers based in Chile and
operating in a particular sector choose in every period the set of foreign countries they want
to serve, in order to maximize their expected flow of profits. We take the creation and
destruction of firms as exogenous and endogenize their supply decision in each foreign market.
The following model is assumed to apply to any sector and, in particular, to the sector of
chemicals and chemical products considered in the empirical section.
Sections 4.1 and 4.2 describe, respectively, the demand and the supply sides of the model.
Given the setting introduced in these two sections, subsection 4.3 then shows how to derive
constraints on the observed behavior of firms that can be used for estimation and inference.
These constraints are defined through moment inequalities. Specifically, subsection 4.3 de-
scribes a general method to derive moment inequalities in a dynamic discrete choice setting
in which perfect foresight on the part of the agents is not necessarily imposed.
4.1 Demand
Each country j is populated by a representative consumer who has a constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) utility function over the different varieties i available in each sector:
Qjt =
[ ∫
i∈Ajt
q
η−1
η
ijt di
] η
η−1
, η > 1
where Ajt represents the set of available varieties, η is the elasticity of substitution between
varieties in the sector, and qijt is the consumption of variety i. Given this utility function, the
resulting demand for each variety is:
qijt =
p−ηijt
P 1−ηjt
Cjt (1)
where Cjt is the total consumption of country j in the sector to which variety i belongs,12 and
Pjt is the sectoral price index in country j:
12From now on, all the nominal variables appearing in the model should be understood as expressed in the
same unit of currency.
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Pjt =
[ ∫
i∈Ajt
p1−ηijt di
] 1
1−η
4.2 Supply
Each variety is produced monopolistically by a single-product firm. We identify each firm by
the same subindex i that identifies varieties. These firms are located in Chile but may sell in
every country j. A firm serving market j may face four different types of costs:
(1) marginal cost or cost per unit of output shipped to market j. It includes production
costs, transport costs, taxes and tariffs. It is denoted as mcijt and assumed to be constant.13
We model the marginal cost that firm i faces in country j at period t (in logs) as:
ln(mcijt) = ln(fit) + ln(gMjt ) + 
M
ijt
where fit denotes the effect of firm characteristics, gMjt captures the effect of destination country
characteristics, and Mijt is an error term. We assume the following functional form for fit:
ln(fit) = βM0 + β
M
ds ln(domsalesit) + β
M
s skillit + β
M
w ln(avgwageit) + β
M
va ln(avgvaladdit)
where βM0 is a constant, domsales is sales revenue in Chile, skill indicates the proportion of
skilled workers, avgwage is the average wage in the firm, and avgvaladd denotes the average
value added per worker. The four variables are used as proxies for the firm’s unit cost function.
Concerning the term gMjt we impose:
ln(gMjt ) = β
M
t +β
M
ar avlrerj+β
M
dr dvlrerjt+β
M
l lawj+β
M
b borderj+β
M
c contj+β
M
l lanj+β
M
gpcgdppcj
where βMt is a time effect, avlrer and dvlrer capture, respectively, the sample mean and the
corresponding year-to-year deviations of the real exchange rate (in logs), law is a measure of
the quality of legal framework, and border, cont, lan, and gdppc are dummies that indicate,
respectively, whether the destination country shares border, continent, official language, or
GDP per capita classification with Chile. Most of these variables are standard in the gravity
equation literature as proxies for international transport costs and, therefore, we refer to them
as gravity variables. We allow the long term effect of the real exchange rate (captured by βMar )
to be different from the short run effect (βMdr ). The GDP per capita dummy is included as
proxy for within-country transport costs and quality of judicial institutions.
13Constant marginal costs are convenient because, conditional on the firm exporting to a set of countries,
they make the supply decision in any of those countries independent of the supply decision in the others.
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(2) fixed cost faced by the firm every year it is exporting to market j, independently of the
quantity exported and of its previous exporting history in this or in other foreign markets. It
encompasses, among other factors, the cost of marketing campaigns, expenditures on updating
information on the characteristics of the market, and the cost of participation in fairs. It is
denoted as fcijt and modeled as:
fcijt = gFj + 
F
ijt (2)
where gFj is a term that depends on observable gravity variables and 
F
ijt is an error term. The
term gFj is modeled as:
gFj = µ
F
0 + µ
F
c contj + µ
F
l lanj + µ
F
gpcgdppcj (3)
where cont, lan, and gdppc are the same dummy variables included in the expression for gMjt .
(3) sunk cost or startup cost faced by firms that were not exporting to country j in the
previous period. These sunk costs account, among other factors, for the costs of building
distribution networks, hiring workers with specific skills (e.g. knowledge of foreign languages),
and acquiring information about country-specific preferences and legal requirements needed to
commercialize products in that country. We account in the model for the possibility that these
costs are smaller for those firms that have been previously exporting to countries similar to j.
The intuition is that these firms might have already gone through a big part of the adaptation
process that generates these sunk costs before actually accessing country j. Therefore, we
introduce a term that accounts for the effect of the previous exporting history of the firm on
sunk costs:
scijbt−1t = g
S
j − eSjbt−1 + Sijt
where gSj depends on observable gravity variables, e
S
jbt−1 depends on extended gravity variables,
and Sijt is an error term. The extended gravity term captures the reduction in the sunk cost
of exporting to country j for a firm that in the previous period was exporting to the bundle
of countries bt−1.14
The gravity term in sunk costs is modeled analogously to the one in fixed costs:
gSj = µ
S
0 + µ
S
c contj + µ
S
l lanj + µ
S
gpcgdppcj (4)
while the extended gravity term is specified as:
eSjbt−1 = ζ
S
b border
e
jbt−1 + ζ
S
c cont
e
jbt−1 + ζ
S
l lan
e
jbt−1 + ζ
S
gdpgdppc
e
jbt−1 (5)
where bordere, conte, lane, and gdppce are dummy variables that take value one if the bundle
14bt−1 = ∅ denotes that the firm was not exporting in the previous period.
11
of countries bt−1 to which the firm was exporting in the previous period includes at least one
country that shares, respectively, border, continent, official language, and GDP per capita
group with the destination country j and that characteristic is not shared by the country of
origin of the firm (i.e. Chile).15
Note that the extended gravity term eSjbt−1 will be zero when: (a) firm i did not export in
the previous period; (b) firm i exported only to countries that do not share border, continent,
official language, nor GDP per capita group with country j; (c) country j shares border with
Chile, is in South America, has Spanish as official language, and is classified as an Upper
Middle Income country.
(4) basic cost or startup cost that the firm must pay if it was not exporting to any country
in the previous period. This fourth type of trade cost is included in the model in order to
account for the bureaucratic costs in permits and licenses that a firm must face when starting
to export. Note that it is paid only once, no matter to how many countries the firm is starting
to export in period t. It is denoted by bc and it is modeled as:
bcit = µB0 + 
B
it (6)
where µB0 is a constant, and 
B
ijt collects the unobservable factors.
The model described above includes 36 parameters: 23 of them enter the expression for the
gross profits from exporting, including 11 time effects (β); 4 enter the expression for fixed
costs (µF ); 8 appear in the expression for sunk costs (µS , ζS); and 1 in the basic costs (µB).
We group all these parameters into a single parameter vector θ = (β, µF , µS , µB, ζS). Section
6 specifies all the assumptions on the statistical properties of the error terms (Mijt, 
F
ijt, 
S
ijt,
Bit ).
4.3 Firm’s Optimization Problem
We use the structure described above to derive moment inequalities. These inequalities arise
from firms’ optimizing behavior. We can split the optimization problem faced by firms in
every period into two sequential problems: (a) first, firms solve a static optimization prob-
lem and choose an optimal price and quantity in every country conditional on serving that
country ; (b) second, firms solve a dynamic optimization problem and choose the bundle of
countries to which they will supply a positive amount of output. Subsection 4.3.1 describes
the static problem and subsection 4.3.2 analyses the dynamic one. Subsection 4.3.3 maps
firms’ optimizing behavior into moment inequalities.
15E.g. the extended gravity variable lane takes value 1 if country j shares official language with at least one
country included in the bundle of countries bt−1 and that language is not the official language of Chile (i.e.
Spanish).
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4.3.1 Static Problem of the Firm
We begin by deriving the maximum gross profits that a firm may earn in a country j condi-
tional on operating in it. These are defined as revenue from exporting minus variable trade
costs. Given the assumption of constant marginal trade costs, the variable trade costs are just
the product of these marginal costs and the quantity exported. Therefore, the gross profits
are defined as profits before accounting for fixed, sunk, or basic costs.
A continuum of varieties is supplied in every country. Therefore, each supplier sets its
price in country j taking the sectoral price index, Pjt, as given. Taking into account our
demand structure, this means that firms set a fixed multiplicative markup over marginal cost.
As a result, the price in market j is:
pijt =
η
η − 1mcijt
Plugging this price into our demand (see eq.(1)) gives the revenue earned by firm i in country
j:
rijt =
( η
η − 1
mcijt
Pjt
)1−η
Cjt (7)
Fixed markups and constant marginal costs imply that the maximum gross profits for firm i
of exporting to country j at period t are proportional to revenue:
vijt =
1
η
rijt (8)
4.3.2 Dynamic Problem of the Firm
As indicated above, in addition to marginal costs, firms may have to pay fixed, sunk, and
basic costs when exporting to a set of countries bt. We define net profits from exporting as
export profits after accounting for all the possible trade costs. Specifically, we can write the
net profits for firm i of exporting to country j at period t given that it exported in the previous
period to a bundle of countries bt−1 as:
piijbt−1t = vijt − fcijt − 1{j /∈ bt−1}scijbt−1t
where 1{j /∈ bt−1} is an indicator function for firm i not exporting to country j in t − 1.
Aggregating across countries we obtain the total net profits for the current export bundle bt:
piibtbt−1t =
∑
j∈bt
piijbt−1t − 1{bt−1 = ∅}bcit
where 1{bt−1 = ∅} is an indicator function for firm i not exporting at all in t− 1.
While bt denotes a generic bundle of countries that a firm might choose in period t, we
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use ot to identify the observed export bundle in that period t (i.e. the bundle selected by
a firm in t). Assumption 1 below indicates how the choice of this bundle is made. While
Assumption 1 is compatible with firms being perfectly forward looking and taking in every
period the export decision that maximizes the expected value of the sum of discounted profits
over an unbounded horizon, it is weaker than this and allows for other decision criteria that
firms might have.
Assumption 1 Let us denote by oT1 = {o1, o2, . . . , oT } the observed sequence of bundles cho-
sen by any given firm i between periods 1 and T . Given a sequence of information sets for firm
i at different time periods, {Jit, Jit+1, . . . }, a sequence of choice sets from which firm i picks
its preferred export bundle, {Bibt−1t, Bibtt+1, . . . }, and a particular conditional expectation
function Ei[·] capturing its subjective expectations:
ot = argmax
bt∈Biot−1t
Ei
[
Πibtot−1t|Jit
] ∀ t = 1, 2, . . . , T (9)
where
Πibtot−1t = piibtot−1t + δpiibt+1btt+1 + ωibt+1t+2,
the term ωibt+1t+2 is any arbitrary function of the discount factor, δ, and the static export
profits the firm might obtain in periods t+ 2 and after:
ωibt+1t+2 = ωit+2(δ, piibt+2bt+1t+2, piibt+3bt+2t+3, . . . ),
and the bundle bt+s is defined as the optimal bundle that would be chosen at period t + s if
the bundle bt+s−1 was chosen at period t+ s− 1:
bt+s = argmax
bt+s∈Bibt+s−1t+s
Ei
[
Πibt+sbt+s−1t+s|Jit+s
]
, ∀s ≥ 1.
Assumption 1 links the observed export choices made by each firm in each period with the
structure described in sections 4.1 and 4.2. It models firm’s choice at period t as the outcome
of an optimization problem that is defined by four elements: (1) a function Πibtot−1t; (2)
subjective expectations, as captured by a conditional expectation function, Ei[·]; (3) knowledge
about the relevant environment included in an information set, Jit; and, (4) the set of options
taken into account by the firm (i.e. possible combinations of foreign countries to which firm i
considers exporting), as defined by a choice or consideration set, Biot−1t.16
16Note that we allow the consideration set of firm i at period t to depend on the bundle of countries it chose
in the previous period. Also note that the bundles {bt+s}s≥1 are random variables from the perspective of
period t. The reason is that the value of {bt+s}s≥1 depends on the information sets {Jt+s}s≥1, and these one
might be unknown to firm i at period t.
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Assumption 1 does not impose any restriction on subjective expectations, information sets
and consideration sets.17 However, it assumes that the function Πibtot−1t, which firms care
about when selecting the set of countries to which they export at period t, is a discounted
sum of the net profits obtained at t, piibtot−1t, the profits the firm will obtain at t + 1 given
the choice bt made at t, piibt+1btt+1, and an arbitrary function that is allowed to change across
firms, time periods and bundles chosen at t + 1, ωibt+1t+2. Assumption 1 restricts ωibt+1t+2
to be a function of the discount factor and the static profits that the firm might obtain in
periods t+ 2 and later.18
The introduction of the function ωibt+1t+2 makes the optimization defined in equation (9)
compatible with firms being forward-looking in many different degrees. Specifically, Assump-
tion 1 is compatible with firms that take into account the effect of their current choices on
future profits in any of the three following ways:
1. only one period ahead:
ωibt+1t+2 = 0;
2. any finite number p of periods ahead:
ωibt+1t+2 = δ
2piibt+2bt+1t+2 + δ
3piibt+3bt+2t+3 + · · ·+ δppiibt+pbt+p−1t+p
with
bt+s = argmax
bt+s∈Bibt+s−1t+s
Ei
[
Πibt+sbt+s−1t+s|Jit+s
] ∀s = 2, . . . , p;
3. or an infinite number of future periods ahead (i.e. perfectly forward looking firms):
ωibt+1t+2 = Ei
[
Πibt+2bt+1t|Jit+2
]
with
bt+2 = argmax
bt+2∈Bibt+1t+2
Ei
[
Πibt+2bt+1t+2|Jit+2
]
.
In summary, Assumption 1 imposes only three constraints on firms’ behavior: (1) firms
take into account the effect of their current choice on static profits at least one period ahead;
17Propositon 1 and Assumption 2 impose some restrictions on these three elements. For details, refer to
the discussion contained in Section 4.3.3. Note in particular that Assumptions 1 and 2, and Propositon 1, are
consistent with firms having rational expectations.
18This characterization of the function ωibt+1t+2 is more restrictive than necessary for our estimation method
to provide consistent estimates. In order for our moment inequalities to be correctly defined, the function
ωibt+1t+2 may take any shape as long as it does not depend directly on the set of countries bt selected at t. Given
that any firm i exporting to any given bundle bt+s, for any s, will pay or not sunk and basic costs of exporting
depending only on the export bundle bt+s−1 (i.e. independently of bt+s−2, bt+s−3, . . . ), the independence
between ωibt+1t+2 and bt, conditional on bt+1, is guaranteed as long as ωibt+1t+2 is just a function of the discount
factor and the static profits in periods t+ 2 and after: ωibt+1t+2 = ωit+2(δ, piibt+2bt+1t+2, piibt+3bt+2t+3, . . . ).
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(2) firms internalize in t that the set of countries to which they are going to export to in the
next period, bt+1, is a random variable and that it will be determined in t + 1 by solving
an optimization problem analogous to the one they are facing in the current period; (3) the
current choice bt enters the objective function of the firm only through its effect on the static
profits in periods t and t+ 1, and on the choice bt+1 to be taken in period t+ 1.
4.3.3 Deriving Moment Inequalities: One-period Deviations
We apply an analogue of Euler’s perturbation method to derive moment inequalities. The the-
oretical possibility of deriving moment inequalities by applying Euler’s perturbation method
to the analysis of single agent dynamic discrete choice problems appears in Pakes et al. (2006)
and Pakes (forthcoming). In adapting the intuition contained in these papers to our setting,
we will form inequalities by comparing the actual sequence of bundles observed for a given firm
i with alternative sequences that differ from it only in one period. Using the same notation
as before, oT1 = {o1, . . . , ot, ot+1 . . . , oT } denotes the observed sequence of country bundles
selected by a particular firm. We define an alternative sequence of bundles that differs from
oT1 at a particular period t:
{o1, . . . ot−1, o′t, ot+1 . . . , oT },
where o′t denotes a counterfactual bundle for period t. Note that when the firm makes the
choice at period t the bundles of countries that will be chosen in future periods are random
variables, {ot+s}s≥1, as they depend on factors included in future information sets, {Jt+s}s≥1,
that might be unknown to the firm at period t.
Proposition 1 If o′t ∈ Biot−1t and all the possible realizations of ot+1 are in Bio′tt+1, then:
Ei[piiotot−1t + δpiiot+1ott+1|Jit] ≥ Ei[piio′tot−1t + δpiiot+1o′tt+1|Jit], (10)
and
ot+1 = argmax
bt+1∈Biott+1
Ei
[
Πibt+1ott+1|Jit+1
]
.
The proof of Proposition 1 is contained in Section A.1 in the Appendix.19 Intuitively, if the
bundle that would be chosen at period t+1 conditional on choosing ot at period t, ot+1, could
have been chosen even if o′t had been picked (instead of ot), then the sequence {o′t,o′t+1}, where
o′t+1 is the bundle of countries that the firm would have picked at t+ 1 had the firm exported
to o′t in the previous period, is weakly preferred at period t over the sequence {o′t,ot+1}. Since
ot was preferred over o′t, then transitivity of preferences insures that the export path {ot,ot+1}
was weakly preferred at period t over the alternative path {o′t,ot+1}.
19Note that we use the boldface ot+1 to denote the random variable whose realization is the observed bundle
ot+1.
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Equation (10) refers to the preferences of the firm at the time it had to choose between
the actual and the counterfactual bundle and, therefore, it does not rule out the possibility
that, ex post, the export path {o′t, ot+1} could have generated higher profits than the observed
{ot, ot+1}.20 Assumption 2 below imposes a connection between the preferences of firms at
any time period and the actual realization of the differences in profits between two alternative
export paths.
Proposition 1 imposes some constraints on the counterfactual bundles we can use to build
moment inequalities. It requires in particular that the counterfactual bundle, o′t, belongs
to the consideration or choice set of the firm at period t, and that the firm could have still
chosen the bundle indicated by ot+1 even if it picked o′t at period t. As shown in Section 5, the
counterfactuals we use in the estimation diverge from the actual ones in that either they add
or subtract one country to the bundle, they switch one export destination for an alternative
one, or they exit exporting completely. Therefore we are implicitly assuming choice sets for
each firm and time period that include at least the actual observed choice and a small number
of variations around it.21
In order to simplify notation, we rewrite the inequality in equation (10):
Ei[piidot+1t|Jit] ≥ 0 (11)
where d = (ot, o′t) denotes a particular deviation at period t and:
piidot+1t = (piiotot−1t − piio′tot−1t) + δ(piiot+1ott+1 − piiot+1o′tt+1)
Given that the inequality in equation (11) holds for every possible deviation d, we can aggre-
gate across deviations in a single inequality. These deviations might differ in the alternative
bundle of countries, o′t, used to build the deviation d, in the firm, and in the time period in
which it is applied. We can therefore build a generic inequality as:
1
Dk
I∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
Dkit∑
d=1
Ei[piidot+1t|Jit] ≥ 0
20More precisely, note that Proposition 1 does not imply:
Ei[piiotot−1t + δpiiot+1ott+1|Jit] ≥ Ei[piio′tot−1t + δpiiot+1o′tt+1|Jit],
nor
piiotot−1t + δpiiot+1ott+1 ≥ piio′tot−1t + δpiiot+1o′tt+1,
where ot+1 is the bundle to which firm i is observed to export at period t+ 1.
21Note that we are not specifying the exact limits of the choice set. We are just imposing some requirements
on its minimum size. These requirements are obviously satisfied by a choice set that includes all the possible
combinations of all countries existing in the world.
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and Dk =
∑I
i=1
∑T
t=1D
k
it is the number of observations used in the inequality.
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Finally, in order to derive moment inequalities from these theoretical inequalities, we need
to restrict the behavioral expectations of the agents. The following assumption imposes the
necessary constraint on the set of conditional expectation functions {Ei[·]}Ii=1.
Assumption 2 There is a positive valued function gkl(·) and an xidt ∈ Jit such that:
1
Dk
I∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
Dkit∑
d=1
Ei[piidot+1t|Jit] ≥ 0 ⇒ E
[ 1
Dk
I∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
Dkit∑
d=1
piidot+1tgkl(xidt)
]
≥ 0, (12)
and E[·] denotes the statistical expectation or expectation with respect to the data generation
process.
Intuitively, Assumption 2 implies that agents make the right choices on average, where the
average is computed across choices made by different firms in multiple periods and with respect
to multiple alternatives or counterfactuals. Aggregating across firms, years, and deviations has
the advantage of making Assumption 2 robust against expectational errors that are correlated
across firms in a single year, or across firms and years in a single country. Assumption 2 does
not impose that every firm must have rational expectations (i.e. Ei[·] = E[·], ∀i) but it is
consistent with it. In the same way, Assumption 2 is not violated either if firms are assumed
to have perfect foresight.
Assumption 2 does not specify the information set of the agents, Jit, but it imposes mild
restrictions on it. Specifically, it assumes that the variables used as instruments in the moment
inequalities, gkl(xidt), are contained in the information set of the agent at the time it took
the decision from which we are deviating in the counterfactual. As can be seen in Section 5,
the only instruments we will use are indicator functions that classify firms and countries into
groups according to their size. Therefore, the only assumptions imposed on the information
set of the agents is that they know their own volume of domestic sales and the GDP of the
countries included in their consideration or choice sets.
Assumptions 1 and 2 are not enough to rely on likelihood methods to identify the true
vector of parameters θ. In order to derive a likelihood function from the model described in
sections 4.1 and 4.2, we would need to specify the function ωibt+1t+2 for every i and t, the
expectation function Ei[·] for every i, the information set Jit corresponding to every i and
t, and the specific choice set Bibt−1t that each firm considers in each period.23 All these are
22Abusing notation, we use Dk below to denote both the set of deviations used to build the corresponding
inequality and its cardinality.
23Specifically, Assumption 1 and 2 are compatible with (but not restrictive to) firms that: (1) are perfectly
forward looking and, therefore, select the set of countries they export to by maximizing their future stream of
profits over an infinite horizon; (2) have rational expectations; and, (3) consider in every period the profits of
exporting to every possible combination of countries in the world (i.e. to 2N possible choices, where N is the
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elements on which we actually have very little information. In contrast, Assumptions 1 and 2
are enough to derive moment inequalities that allow us to identify the parameter θ.
5 Specifying Moments: Bounding Cost Parameters
As it will be shown in Section 6, we use moment inequalities to estimate the parameters
affecting fixed, sunk and basic costs24. For each of these parameters we build sets of moment
inequalities aimed at identifying both an upper and a lower bound. Building moments implies
two steps: first, we identify all the possible observations that might provide information on
the lower or upper bound for each parameter (i.e. we find the set Dk); second, we aggregate
those observations into one or multiple moments for each parameter-bound pair (i.e. we define
different functions gkl(·)). We illustrate here our procedure with two examples. Specifically, we
examine how we build moments to identify bounds for our baseline fixed cost parameter, µF0 ,
and for the parameter that measures the extended gravity effect of language, ζSl . Additional
examples are provided in the Appendix in Section A.2.
5.1 Identifying Observations
5.1.1 Example 1: Bounding µF0
Imagine we observe a firm i with the following stream of gross profits in country j and an
associated export trajectory
Year 1 2 3 4 5
Profits vij1 vij2 vij3 vij4 vij5
Exports 0 1 1 0 0
where vijt denote the potential gross profits that firm i would obtain in country j if it were
to export at period t, 1 indicates that the firm is exporting to j and 0 indicates that the firm
is not. A possible counterfactual would be
Year 1 2 3 4 5
Actual 0 1 1 0 0
Counterfactual 0 1 1 1 0
number of countries in the world). Given that the cardinality of this choice set is enormous and that computing
the value function for each of its elements is unfeasible with currently available computational capabilities, a
model that imposes these three restrictive assumptions cannot be estimated either through any method that
relies on the specification of a likelihood function. Therefore, even if these three additional assumptions were
imposed, we would still need to use moment inequalities to identify the different parameters of the model.
24There are a total of 13 parameters entering either fixed, sunk or basic costs: (µF0 , µ
F
c , µ
F
l , µ
F
gdp, µ
S
0 , µ
S
c ,
µSl , µ
S
gdp, ζ
S
b , ζ
S
c , ζ
S
l , ζ
S
gdp, µ
B
0 ).
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where we delay the exit period by one year. Assume for simplicity that country j shares the
same continent, language, and GDP per capita group with Chile, meaning that the gravity
variables for these characteristics appearing in the fixed cost term take a value of 0. Then our
counterfactual generates the following difference in profits
piido54 = −vij4 + µF0 + Fij4,
which generates an observation for moment inequality that identifies the lower bound for µF0 .
In order to get an observation that helps to identify the upper bound for µF0 we simply
flip the counterfactual and advance exit by one period,
Year 1 2 3 4 5
Actual 0 1 1 0 0
Counterfactual 0 1 0 0 0
This gives the difference in profits
piido43 = vij3 − µF0 − Fij3
Thus, we have an observation for the moment inequality that identifies the upper bound of
µF0 .
In most cases the parameter of interest will not be the only unknown to appear in an
observation. Following the previous example, if country j had not been in the same continent
as Chile, the two observations described above would have been:
piido54 = −vij4 + µF0 + µFc + Fij4,
and
piido43 = vij3 − µF0 − µFc − Fij3
It is possible that parameters affecting fixed and sunk costs appear both in the same
inequality. Again modifying the original example, return to the case where country j is
assumed to share the same continent, language, and GDP per capita group with Chile (i.e. all
the gravity and extended gravity variables entering fixed and sunk costs are going to take a
value of 0) and imagine that firm i had reentered country j in period 5 in the actual strategy.
In this case the different in profits that contributes to identify the upper bound for µF0 would
not be affected but the one that identifies the lower bound would now be:
piido54 = −vij4 + µF0 + Fij4 − δµS0 − δSij5
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5.1.2 Example 2: Bounding ζSl
Imagine that the same firm i is exporting in year 7 to only one country. This country only
shares official language with some country j and it shares nothing with some other country
j′. The stream of profits and actual export strategies implemented in each country j and j′
are:
Year 7 8 9
Country j
Profits vij7 vij8 vij9
Exports 0 1 0
Country j′
Profits vij′7 vij′8 vij′9
Exports 0 0 0
A possible counterfactual would be:
Year 7 8 9
Actual
Country j 0 1 0
Country j′ 0 0 0
Counterfactual
Country j 0 0 0
Country j′ 0 1 0
where firm i enters country j′ instead of country j. Assume for simplicity that country j and
j′ take the same value of the standard gravity variables and that firm i does not export to
any country in year 9. Then our counterfactual generates the following difference in profits:
piido98 = vij8 − vij′8 + ζSl − Fij8 + Fij′8 − Sij8 + Sij′8 (13)
which generates an observation for the moment inequality identifying the lower bound for ζSl .
Once we impose that ζSl must take a nonnegative value, this observation might be uninfor-
mative if firm i would have preferred country j over country j′ even if the extended gravity
effect of language was zero.
As indicated above in the example for µF0 , other parameters will appear in this inequality
if, for example, country j and j′ take different values of the gravity variables, firm i is observed
to continue exporting to country j at period 9, etc.
If we are looking for an upper bound, then we need to find a year for which there was a
country that benefited from extended gravity effects in language in which firm i did not enter
and another country that did not benefit from these effects in which firm i actually entered.
By building a counterfactual that switches the export strategies in those two countries we find
an observation that helps us identify the upper bound for ζSl .
The procedure to identify bounds for the parameters measuring the extended gravity effects
of border, continent and GDP per capita is completely analogous to the one described above
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for language. We just need to find a pair of countries j and j′ that diverge in the particular
dimension we are interested in, and follow the same steps indicated above.
5.2 Aggregating Observations into Moments
Once we have searched over all firms, countries, and time periods in our sample for actual
strategies and possible counterfactuals that help us identify the upper or lower bound for our
parameters of interest, we need to decide how to aggregate those observations into inequalities.
Assumption 2 imposes that each moment inequality should be an average across firms, years,
and counterfactual countries but allows for some freedom in the deviations to include in each
of the averages. With the aim of getting the tightest possible bounds, we work with four
possible aggregation strategies (i.e. four possible moments) for each bound-parameter pair:
(1) selection of firms (2) selection of countries; (3) no selection; (4) selection of firms and
countries.
How do we select firms for cases (1) and (4)? We know from a regression of observed
export revenue on exporter and destination country characteristics (see Table A.1) that higher
domestic sales are correlated with higher predicted revenue from exporting in every country
and time period. Therefore, as an example, when looking for a lower bound for the parameter
µF0 , we obtain a higher lower bound if we build an inequality that averages only across the
observations coming from large firms (and the opposite for the case in which we are looking
for an upper bound). We define firms as big if their domestic sales in the first year of the
sample (i.e. 1995) were above the median (and vice versa). Given that larger firms have
higher export profits in every country, the selection of firms is irrelevant in those moments
that compare profits between two countries (e.g. moments that identify bounds for ζSl , see
Section 5.1.2).
How do we select countries for cases (2) and (4)? Table A.1 shows that higher GDP in the
destination country is correlated with higher predicted revenue from exporting for every firm
and time period. Therefore, keeping the same example as before, when looking for a lower
bound for parameter µF0 we build an inequality that, for each firm, uses observations that come
from large countries (and the opposite when looking for an upper bound). When looking for
a lower bound for the parameter ζSl we use counterfactuals that make the firm enter those
countries that are large among the ones that the firm did not enter and that did not benefit
from a nonzero extended gravity effect in language. On the contrary, when looking for an
upper bound for this parameter, we use counterfactuals that introduce the firm in countries
that are relatively big among those in which the firm did not enter and that benefited from a
nonzero extended gravity effect in language. We define countries as big if their GDP at the
beginning of the sample period is above the median for the group of countries that could be
used as counterfactuals in each case.
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Not all these moments will be used in the estimation. Some of these aggregations for some
of the bounds end up including very few observations. Even if Assumption 2 imposes only an
asymptotic requirement on the moments used in the estimation, inequalities that use very few
observations may have very large error components and can lead to very misleading results.
We are explicit in Section 8 about the moments used to find our estimates.
Besides the different restrictions on the parameter space coming from the moment inequal-
ities described above, we impose the following additional constraints on the possible values the
parameters may take: (1) all the parameters must take non-negative values; (2) the parame-
ters measuring extended gravity effects cannot take values such that the sunk cost of entering
some country j for a firm exporting in the previous period to some other country j′ becomes
negative. The difference between these constraints in the parameter space and those coming
from moment inequalities is that the former are deterministic and, therefore, are imposed in
every random sample.
6 Estimation Method
Once we have specified the different moment inequalities that identify the parameters entering
the fixed, sunk, and basic costs, it remains to explain how these moments are going to be used
to estimate those parameters. Section 6.1 lays out the linear moment inequality framework in
general terms. Section 6.2 specifies how this framework maps to our setting and we explain
in detail our estimation method.
6.1 The Linear Moment Inequality Framework
We focus here on identification and estimation of the extreme or boundary points of the
identified set, while we leave for Section 7 the discussion about inference and how to build
confidence intervals in the linear moment inequality framework. We follow the approach to
estimation in models in which parameters are defined by moment inequalities contained in
Pakes et al. (2006).
Let there be S linear moment inequalities, with each inequality indexed by s:
ms(θ) = E
[ 1
N
N∑
i=n
(z0n + z1nθ + n)g(z2n)
]
≥ 0 s = 1, 2, . . . , S (14)
where N is the number of observations in the moment inequality, θ is the parameter vector to
estimate, (z0, z1, z2) is a vector of observable variables, and  is an unobservable term. This
set of moment inequalities will usually come from restrictions on the data generation process
derived from a structural model. Given this set of moments, the identified set Θ is defined
as the subset of points satisfying the S linear constraints in equation (14). This identified set
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can be written as the set of values θ such that:
0 =
S∑
s=1
(
min{0,ms(θ)}
)2
We define an analog estimate Θˆ of the identified set Θ as the set of values of θ that minimize
the objective function:
S∑
s=1
(
min{0, m˜s(θ)}
)2 (15)
where m˜s(·) is the sample analog of the corresponding moment inequality ms(·)25:
m˜s(θ) =
1
N
N∑
i=n
(z0n + z1nθ)g(z2n)
As it is shown in Pakes et al. (2006), the bounds of Θˆ are consistent estimates of the corre-
sponding bounds of Θ as long as the sample moments are uniformly consistent estimates of
the population moments:
sup
θ
||m˜s(θ)−ms(θ)|| N→∞−−−−→ 0
Given the specification of the linear moment inequalities in equation (14), the uniform con-
sistency of the sample moments is guaranteed as long as:
1
N
N∑
n=1
ng(z2n)
N→∞−−−−→ 0
6.2 Mapping the Framework to our Model
As a result of Assumption 2, our model provides a set of S moment inequalities where each
moment inequality s is indexed by the pair (k, l):
ms(θ) = E
[ 1
Dk
I∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
Dkit∑
d=1
piidot+1t(θ)gkl(xidt)
]
≥ 0 (17)
25The objective function in equation (15) is a special case of more general Modified Method of Moments
(MMM) test function defined in Andrews and Soares (2010):
SX
s=1
`
min{0, 1
σs(θ)
ms(θ)}
´2
, (16)
where σ2s(θ) is the variance of ms(θ). Equations (15) and (16) are both going to generate the same identified
set. Furthermore, their sample analogs are going to generate also the same estimated set as long as there exists
a parameter θ that makes any of the two functions equal to 0 in the particular random sample under study
(this is going to be the case in our setting, see Section 8).
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where θ = (β, µF , µS , µB, ζS) is the finite dimensional parameter vector that we want to
estimate.
The empirical model described in Section 4 parameterizes the difference in profits as:
piidot+1t(β, µ
F , µS , µB, ζS) = vidt(β)− gFd (µF )−
(
gSdot+1(µ
S)− eSdot+1(ζS)
)− bcdot+1(µB) + ε2d
where each of its terms is defined as:
vidt =
∑
j∈ot
vijt −
∑
j∈o′t
vijt
gFd =
∑
j∈ot
gFj −
∑
j∈o′t
gFj
gSdot+1 =
(∑
j∈ot
1{j /∈ ot−1}gSj −
∑
j∈o′t
1{j /∈ ot−1}gSj
)
+ δ
∑
j∈ot+1
(
1{j /∈ ot} − 1{j /∈ o′t}
)
gSj
eSdot+1 =
∑
j∈ot
1{j /∈ ot−1}eSjot−1 −
∑
j∈o′t
1{j /∈ ot−1}eSjot−1 + δ
∑
j∈ot+1
(
1{j /∈ ot}eSjot
− 1{j /∈ o′t}eSjo′t
)
bcdot+1 =
(
1{ot 6= ∅, ot−1 = ∅} − 1{o′t 6= ∅, ot−1 = ∅}
)
bc+ δ
(
1{ot+1 6= ∅, ot = ∅}
− 1{ot+1 6= ∅, o′t = ∅}
)
bc
ε2d =
∑
j∈ot
Fijt −
∑
j∈o′t
Fijt +
(∑
j∈ot
1{j /∈ ot−1}Sijt −
∑
j∈o′t
1{j /∈ ot−1}Sijt
)
+ δ
∑
j∈ot+1
(
1{j /∈ ot}
− 1{j /∈ o′t}
)
Sijt+1 +
(
1{ot 6= ∅, ot−1 = ∅} − 1{o′t 6= ∅, ot−1 = ∅}
)
Bijt
+ δ
(
1{ot+1 6= ∅, ot = ∅} − 1{ot+1 6= ∅, o′t = ∅}
)
Bijt+1
and the definition of vijt, gFj , g
S
j , e
S
jot−1 , bc, 
F
ijt, 
S
ijt, and 
B
ijt is given in equations (2), (3),
(4), (5), (6), and (8).
A comparison of equation (17) and equation (14) shows that our moment inequalities do
not map exactly to the linear moment inequality framework described in Section 6.1 because
v(·) is a loglinear function of β. However, gF (·), gS(·), eS(·) and bc(·) are linear functions
of the corresponding parameter vectors. We will therefore estimate θ in two stages. In the
first stage, we apply linear panel data estimation techniques to obtain point estimates of β
that are independent of the value estimated for (µF , µS , µB, ζS). In the second stage, we use
the linear moment inequality framework in order to obtain set estimates for (µF , µS , µB, ζS)
conditional on the first stage estimates βˆ.
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6.2.1 First Stage Estimation
All the parameters entering the expression for the gross profits from exporting v(·) appear
also in the expression for the potential revenue from exporting r(·) (see equations (7) and (8)).
Using data on observed export revenues for firms, countries and years with positive exports,
we obtain point estimates for the parameter vector β. In order to obtain these estimates in
the simplest possible way, we exploit the fact that the equilibrium equation for revenue from
exporting that arises from solving the static problem of the firm is loglinear (see equation (7)).
Therefore we estimate β applying a fixed effects estimator on the equation:
ln(rijt) = βZijt + (1− η)Mijt (18)
where Zijt includes all the observable variables26 appearing in equation (7) and Mijt is assumed
to be independent of Zijt. Once we have obtained our estimates βˆ, we define an approximation
to the potential gross profits from exporting for firm i in country j at time t as:
vˆijt = vijt(βˆ) =
1
η
rˆijt =
1
η
αˆ exp(βˆZijt)
where αˆ is defined as the OLS estimate of the only coefficient in a regression of rijt on
exp(βˆZijt) that does not include a constant. The elasticity of substitution η is not uniquely
identified from the reduced form expression for export revenues. Therefore, we borrow the
value of η for from Broda et al. (2006)27. Given our approximation to gross profits vˆijt we
define the first stage error as:
ε1ijt = vijt − vˆijt
and
ε1d =
∑
j∈ot
1ijt −
∑
j∈o′t
1ijt
6.2.2 Second Stage Estimation
Using the results from the first stage estimation, we can rewrite each of our moment inequalities
as:
ms(θ2) = E
[ 1
Dk
I∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
Dkit∑
d=1
(
vˆidt−gFd (µF )−gSdot+1(µS)+eSdot+1(ζS)−bcdot+1(µB)+εd
)
gkl(xidt)
]
≥ 0
26We proxy the term CjtP
η−1
jt with a power function of the GDP of country j at period t.
27Specifically, we use a value of 5.75 for the elasticity of substitution across varieties in the chemicals and
chemical products sector.
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where θ2 = (µF , µS , µB, ζS), and εd = ε1d + ε
2
d. Note that now our moments are linear in
parameters. The sample analogues of these moment inequalities are:
m˜s(θ2) =
1
Dk
I∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
Dkit∑
d=1
(
vˆidt − gFd (µF )− gSdot+1(µS) + eSdot+1(ζS)− bcdot+1(µB)
)
gkl(xidt) ≥ 0
where ot+1 is the realization of the random variable ot+1 (i.e. it is the observed bundle of
countries for firm i at period t+ 1).
Applying the results in Pakes et al. (2006) summarized in section 6.1, the estimated set
Θˆ2 defined as:
Θˆ2 = argmin
θ2
S∑
s=1
(
min{0, m˜s(θ2)}
)2
will be a consistent estimate for the corresponding identified set Θ2 that is obtained from
fixing β at its true value and solving for
min
θ2
S∑
s=1
(
min{0,ms(θ2)}
)2
as long as the following assumption holds
Assumption 3 For every moment inequality s = 1, . . . , S, it holds that:
1
Dk
I∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
Dkit∑
dt=1
εdgkl(xidt)
Dk→∞−−−−−→ 0
and Dk =
∑I
i=1
∑T
t=1D
k
it.
Assumption 3 imposes that the sum of the first and second stage errors is asymptotically
orthogonal to any variable that we are using as instrument in our moment inequalities. Given
that Assumption 2 imposes that xidt belongs to the information set of the agent at the time
it takes the decision from which we deviate, a sufficient condition for Assumption 3 to hold is
that there is no unobservable variable affecting differently the net profits of the actual strategy
and its counterfactual that is known by the firm when taking its decision and not accounted
by us in the model. On the contrary, any unobservable variable that affects identically the net
profits of following the actual or the counterfactual export strategies is differenced out in our
moment inequalities. Assumption 3 may be understood as a no-selection bias assumption: the
decision of firms to serve some country and not others at any period of time must be based
exclusively on observable characteristics of the firm’s environment that the model is taking
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into account.
Our extended gravity estimates might be particularly affected if there are unobservable
firm-country effects that happen to be correlated across countries that are connected through
any of the extended gravity variables (e.g. across countries that have the same official lan-
guage), and that are known to the firm at the time of taking its entry and exit decisions. This
is an example of the typical identification problem, present in many applications, between
heterogeneity and state-dependence.
Concerning the implications of Assumption 3 for the structural errors included in the
model, note that sufficient conditions for Assumption 3 to hold are: (a) Mijt is independently
distributed of Zijt and identically distributed for every i, j, and t (see equation (18)); (b) (Fijt,
Sijt, 
B
it ) is mean independent of any variable included in the information set of the agent Jit.
7 Confidence Intervals
There are a variety of different approaches to inference with moment inequalities. Some of
them aim at finding a confidence interval for the true parameter, others for the identified set,
and finally others for extremum points of this set. Papers that provide methods to compute
confidence intervals for the true parameters are: Imbens and Manski (2004), Romano and
Shaikh (2008), Andrews and Guggenberger (2009), and Andrews and Soares (2010). On the
contrary, papers that focus on confidence intervals for the identified set are Chernozhukov
et al. (2007), Rosen (2008), and Romano and Shaikh (2010). Finally, Pakes et al. (2006)
proposes valid confidence intervals for the boundaries of the identified set. Our estimates of
the confidence interval fit in this later category.28
This section relies heavily on Holmes (2010). Holmes (2010) modifies the approach in
Pakes et al. (2006) in order to take into account that there is correlation in the second stage
error terms across deviations when two deviations involve the same country.
Let us denote by µˆ the vector that stacks the sample average of all the variables in-
cluded in any of the moment inequalities used in the estimation29. Our moments are averages
across deviations and different moments might include different number of deviations. We
denote by Ds the total number of observations used in moment s. Let’s use Σˆ1 to denote the
variance-covariance matrix of the sample mean µˆ under the assumption that µˆ is an average
of independent and identically distributed observations.
Computing the limit distribution of the estimator of the extreme points of the identified
set requires knowing ex ante the binding moments. This is information that the researcher will
28Note that by taking the appropriate limits of confidence intervals that are valid for the extreme values, we
can construct conservative confidence intervals for the identified set and for the true value of the parameter
vector.
29Given that the moment inequalities are sample average themselves, note that building µˆ implies simply
stacking in a column vector all the terms that appear in the moments.
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generally not have and that we certainly don’t have30. Pakes et al. (2006) provide inferential
procedures that do not depend on prior knowledge of which moments bind. This procedure
allows to simulate asymptotically conservative confidence intervals for each extreme point
of the identified set31. These confidence intervals are based on a set of simulation draws
r=1, . . . , R of the moment inequality exercise. Each of these simulations uses a draw from a
normal distribution with mean µˆ and covariance Σˆ1. By plugging each of the components of
the vector drawn r into its corresponding place in its moment inequality we obtain the set of
inequalities:
m˜rs(θ2) ≥ 0 s = 1, . . . , S.
We explain here the procedure to obtain an asymptotically conservative confidence interval
for the upper and lower bound of a particular linear combination of the elements of the
parameter vector θ2. We denote this linear combination as τ :
τ = f · θ2
where f is an arbitrary constant vector of the same dimension as θ2. Specifically, we are
looking for a confidence interval for
τ = f · θ2
and
τ = f · θ2
with θ2 and θ2 defined as:
θ2 = argmax
θ2
τ s.t. θ2 ∈ argmin
θ2
S∑
s=1
(
min{0,ms(θ2)}
)2
θ2 = argmin
θ2
τ s.t. θ2 ∈ argmin
θ2
S∑
s=1
(
min{0,ms(θ2)}
)2
Using the insights in Section 6.1, we know that we can obtain consistent estimates for τ and
τ by computing the corresponding bounds of the set Θˆ2 (see Section 6.1). Let’s denote these
bounds ˆ¯τ and τˆ :
ˆ¯τ = f · ˆ¯θ2
τˆ = f · θˆ2
30Most of the parameters identified in this paper through moment inequalities appear simultaneously in most
of our moments, making it impossible to know which moments bind and, therefore, define the identified set.
31This method assumes identical number of observations per moment, independent observations within mo-
ments, and no first-stage error.
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with ˆ¯θ2 and θˆ2 defined as:
ˆ¯θ2 = argmax
θ2
τ s.t. θ2 ∈ argmin
θ2
S∑
s=1
(
min{0, m˜s(θ2)}
)2
θˆ2 = argmin
θ2
τ s.t. θ2 ∈ argmin
θ2
S∑
s=1
(
min{0, m˜s(θ2)}
)2
The first step to build our confidence intervals is to compute two S×1 vectors of shifters that
measure the degree of slackness of each moment inequality in the actual sample:
ˆ¯γs ≡ max{0, m˜s(ˆ¯θ2)}
γˆs ≡ max{0, m˜s(θˆ2)}
We are going to obtain confidence intervals for τ and τ through simulation. Specifically,
using these shifters, the set of moment inequalities linked to the draw r, and the number of
observations per moment in the sample, we are going to obtain a draw from the distribution
from which we derive our confidence intervals. We denote these draws as ˆ¯τ r and τˆ r and
compute them as:
ˆ¯τ r = f · ˆ¯θr2
τˆ r = f · θˆr2
with θ¯r2 and θ
r
2 defined as:
θ¯r2 = argmax
θ2
τ s.t. θ2 ∈ argmin
θ2
S∑
s=1
(
min{0, m˜rs(θ2) +
1√
2 ln(ln(Ds))
γ¯s})2
θr2 = argmin
θ2
τ s.t. θ2 ∈ argmin
θ2
S∑
s=1
(
min{0, m˜rs(θ2) +
1√
2 ln(ln(Ds))
γs})2
Iterating this procedure for each r, we obtain R realizations of the vector (τ r,τ¯ r). Taking the
α/2 percentile of the realizations for the lower bound and the 1 − α/2 percentile of the ones
for the upper bound, we compute the 1− α confidence intervals.
The method described above does not account for correlation among observations included
in the same moment inequality. This type of correlation structure might appear in our model
given that different deviations involve the same set of countries. In order to account for
this type of correlation structure we follow Holmes (2010) and use subsampling methods
to compute a new covariance matrix for the vector µˆ. Each subsample is generated in the
following way. Given a set of N countries existing in our database, we chose a random
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subsample of destinations of size Nb. We define a deviation subsample as the set of deviations
for which both the actual and the counterfactual country belong to the random subsample of
destinations. For each of these subsamples, we compute a sample mean µˆb of each variable
included in each moment inequality. The vector µˆb averages only across deviations included
in the deviation subsample. Iterating this subsampling process B times and using the set of
B sample averages µˆb computed in this way, we compute an estimator Σˆ2 for the covariance
matrix associated with µˆ that accounts for correlation in the observations:
Σˆ2 =
Nb
N
Σˆb
where
Σˆb =
1
B
B∑
b=1
(µˆb − µˆ)(µˆb − µˆ)′
Substituting Σˆ2 for Σˆ1 and following the same simulation procedure described above provides
with an estimate of a confidence interval for τ¯ and τ that account for correlation in the
observations.
8 Baseline Results
This section presents the baseline estimates for the different parameters affecting fixed, sunk
and basic costs of exporting for firms operating in the chemical sector32. These results use
only one moment inequality per bound-parameter pair. Concerning the moments included in
the estimation, the tighter set of moments among the ones described in Section 5.2 are used.
Specifically, we only use big firms and big countries to identify lower bounds and the set of all
firms and small countries to identify upper bounds33. Table 5 presents a summary of the 26
moment inequalities used in the estimation of the results presented in this section. We denote
this set of moments as the narrow version. In Section 9 we present results for alternative
combinations of moment inequalities.
The first two columns of Table 6 contain the lower and upper bound estimates for each
parameter. These numbers indicate the minimum and maximum values that are consistent
32The first stage estimation results are contained in Table A.1. We use this first stage result as a reduced
form approximation to gross profits from exporting. They predict the counterfactual profits from actions firms
did not implement but that we introduce in our moment inequalities. Table A.1 shows the first stage estimates
for three different cases: no censorship in the revenue equation (1st column); we drop the export revenues below
1,000 USD (2nd column); we drop the export revenues below 5,000 USD (3rd column). We use the results in
column one in the second stage. Columns two and three present coefficients that are very similar to those in
column one. This shows that our predicted gross profits are not driven by many small export flows that could
be thought of as samples or pure experimentation.
33The definition of big and small countries as well as big and small firms is given in Section 5.2. We could
not use only small firms to identify upper bounds because there are very few small exporting firms and, in
consequence, the different inequalities ended up having very few observations.
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with the sample moment inequalities. The compute these bounds or extreme points without
imposing any restriction on the values that the other parameters may take.
The lower bound is equal to zero for many of the parameters. The reason for this is that
each of the variables that we are including in the specification of fixed and sunk costs tends
to be very correlated with a subgroup of the remaining variables. Therefore, whenever we
observe a particular entry or exit of any given firm in any given country, it is possible to load
the explanation of that behavior on any of the effects that are concurrent in it. If the same
effects appear in similar magnitude for different observations, then it is going to be impossible
to reject the possibility that each of those factors has a zero effect34. The correlation between
the different explanatory variables can be observed in Table 5. Note that the four extended
gravity variables tend to take the same sign in every moment. The same can be said for the
standard gravity variables entering sunk costs and the ones affecting fixed costs.
Having a lower bound of zero for each of the parameters separately does not imply that the
estimated set includes a point where all the parameters are simultaneously zero. Specifically,
the identified set is not the Cartersian product of the intervals presented in Table 6. Given the
impossibility of computing the extreme values of the identified set in every possible dimension,
Table 7 shows the predicted costs of exporting to a selected group of countries. This table
contains the upfront cost a firm must pay in order to export to a given country (indicated in
the first column) depending on the country to which the firm was exporting in the previous
period (indicated in the second column)35. This upfront cost can be decomposed into fixed,
sunk and basic costs of exporting. This decomposition is done in Table 8 for the midpoint of
each of the intervals shown in Table 736
The estimates show that exporting to any country, no matter how similar this one is to
34The reason for the strong correlation in gravity effects is that most of the countries that have Spanish as
official language are located in South America and have levels of GDP per capita similar to Chile.
35Each country represents a particular linear combination of the parameters included in the vector θ2. There-
fore, the bounds shown in Table 7 are just extremum estimators of the identified set in dimensions different
from the ones shown in Table 6. Our model yields different upfront costs for two countries j and j′ only if they
have different values for at least one of the variables included in fixed or sunk costs. Therefore, the reader can
substitute any of the countries in Table 7 for any other one that has the same gravity and extended gravity
characteristics and the indicated upfront costs are going to be equally applicable. For example, the estimated
fixed cost of exporting to Germany is the same as the one estimated for the US and the sunk cost of entering
Germany for a firm that is previously exporting to Austria is estimated to be the same as the one of entering
the US for a firm previously exporting to Canada.
36The decomposition is ad hoc. While the estimated intervals in Table 7 come directly from the model and
the linear inequalities implied by it, the numbers in Table 8 impose additional assumptions. Firstly, they
are built using only the midpoint of the intervals in Table 7. Secondly, the sunk costs are computed as the
difference between the corresponding midpoints for the upfront costs borne by firms that were not exporting
to the destination country in the previous year and the one faced by firms that were exporting to it. Taking
differences between the sunk costs yields the extended gravity effect. Finally, the basic costs are computed as
the difference in the upfront costs’ midpoint for the firms that were not exporting at all in the previous period
and those that were exporting to some country that implies no extended gravity effect with the destination
country. It is this ad hoc procedure what explains that, for example, Table 8 indicates different numbers
for the basic costs depending on the destination country (even though they are assumed in the model to be
independent of the set of countries to which a firm is exporting).
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Chile, implies high fixed costs. Gravity forces modify these fixed costs in relatively small
magnitudes. While the fixed costs of exporting to the US are estimated to lie between 223,708
USD and 242,627 USD, the corresponding ones for Colombia are estimated to take a value
between 215,785 USD and 235,578 USD. Table 7 shows that the estimated mean gross export
profits for the firms that exported a positive quantity to each of these countries are nearly two
times the estimated fixed costs in the case of the US, and nearly 50% higher than those fixed
costs in the case of Colombia. Country specific sunk costs of exporting are estimated to be in
general lower than fixed costs but they are much more affected by gravity. In particular, the
sunk cost of exporting to the US for a firm that does not profit from any extended gravity
effect is estimated to be between 3 and 4 times larger than the sunk costs of exporting to
Colombia. By comparing the approximated sunk cost of exporting to the US (230,089 USD)
with the one of exporting to Spain (162,440 USD) and the one of exporting to Brazil (118,589
USD) with the corresponding one for Colombia (69,578 USD), we see that linguistic factors
have a big effect on sunk costs. In the same way, the comparison of the corresponding numbers
for the US and Brazil shows that the joint effect of changes in continent and GDP per capita
group also push up the sunk costs of exporting significantly.
Concerning the extended gravity effects, the estimates in Tables 7 and 8 show that having
exported to a country that has the same language as the one the firm is trying to access has a
significant effect in reducing the entry costs. In particular, having exported to the UK reduces
the sunk costs of entering the US by 18.86% (43,385 USD) while having export experience
in a portuguese speaking country decreases the entry costs in Brazil by an estimated 27.97%
(33,169 USD). On the contrary, geographic factors don’t seem to generate any significant
extended gravity effect. For example, having exported to Canada implies no advantage with
respect to having exported to the UK for accessing the US market and the sunk costs of
exporting to Spain for a firm that was previously exporting to France are estimated to be the
same as those for a firm that was only exporting to Colombia.
9 Robustness
This section replicates the estimation exercise using different moments from the ones employed
to obtain the results in Section 8. We explore in particular two different variants.
First, we analyze the influence of the moment aimed at identifying the lower bound of
the parameter measuring the basic costs of exporting, µB0 , on our estimates. This bound is
identified out of firms that are entering into exporting: firms that at some period t − 1 were
not exporting to any country, but that are exporting at period t. There are only 86 entry
events of this type in the sample (see last column corresponding to moment 6 in Table 5) and,
therefore, the corresponding moment will be an average of only 86 observations. As it can
be seen in Table 5, all the moments included in the estimation use a number of observations
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that is 5 times larger and in most of the cases it is actually 10 times larger. Therefore, by
not including this moment we want to avoid estimates that are might be driven only by very
few observations. A comparison of Table A.2 and Table 6 shows that the estimated set is
not affected at all by the inclusion or not of this particular moment. In other terms, this
moment happens to be non-binding in the original set of results. Therefore, Tables 7 and
8 remain invariant no matter whether we include or not this extra moment. Furthermore,
the confidence intervals for the different parameters remain very similar except for the upper
bound of the parameter µB0 itself.
Second, we redo the estimation exercise using moments that do not select firms nor coun-
terfactual countries. We still use only one moment inequality per parameter-bound pair but,
instead of selecting deviations based on the counterfactual countries and firms involved, we
aggregate across all the possible deviations that identify the corresponding bound. We denote
this set of moments as the wide version. They are summarized in Table A.3. Tables A.4,
A.5, and A.6 are the analogous of 6, 7, and 8 for the case of the wide version of moments.
Comparing both sets of tables, we can observe that, as expected, the wide version of moments
generates larger intervals for each parameter than the narrow version. Nevertheless, the main
conclusions outlined in Section 8 still hold: (1) the fixed costs vary much less with gravity
variables than the sunk costs; (2) the sunk costs increase as the destination country differen-
tiates from Chile in continent, language and GDP per capita; (3) the main extended gravity
effect is generated by a firm exporting in the previous period to a country that shares official
language with the destination country.
10 Concluding Remarks
This paper applies the moment inequalities approach to the estimation of a structural model
of international trade. In recent years, new rich databases for the study of trade flows have
become available. Such data sets contain information for several years on the specific output
volume each firm exports to each possible destination country in the world37. A common
feature of these datasets is that, no matter how narrowly we define the group of firms we want
to examine, there is always variation across them in the destination countries they choose to
serve. Therefore, modeling firms’ entry and exit decisions into individual countries becomes
a crucial element of any structural model that tries to examine trade flows at the firm level.
Concurrently with the upsurge in the availability of firm-level destination specific export
data, great interest has arisen in the study of the interactions between destination markets. We
37This data is collected by national customs agencies. A nonexhaustive list of countries that have made their
data available for research are: Chile (Alvarez et al. (2008)), Brazil (Arkolakis and Muendler (2009)), Argentina
(Albornoz et al. (2010)), China (Defever et al. (2010)), France (Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2010), Buono et
al. (2008)), Colombia (Eaton et al. (2008)), Ireland (Lawless (2009)), Peru (Martincus and Carballo (2008)),
Denmark (Munch and Nguyen (2009)), Portugal (Bastos and Silva (2010)).
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introduce the concept of extended gravity in order to denote these interactions. Trade theory
had traditionally attempted to explain trade flows by focusing exclusively on the characteristics
of each exporting-importing country pair. Papers like Albornoz et al. (2010) and Chaney
(2010) introduce theoretical mechanisms that point out the need to account for the full export
history of each firm when trying to predict firm-level trade behavior in any given country at
any moment of time.
Models that allow for country-specific entry costs and extended gravity effects imply that
firms’ decision to enter (or exit) each country is intrinsically dynamic38 and cannot be an-
alyzed separately of the corresponding decision for the other countries39. This makes the
choice set of firms extremely complex. It is precisely this complexity that makes moment
inequalities ideal to study the export decision problem of the firm. Furthermore, the moment
inequality approach implemented in this paper has the additional advantage of allowing for
the identification and estimation of parameters of interest with a minimum number of struc-
tural assumptions. Specifically, this approach does not require a full specification of firms’
expectations, information sets, and consideration sets, at the time of choosing their export
destinations.
We estimate trade costs of exporting using firm-level export data for an unbalanced panel
of Chilean manufacturing firms operating in the chemicals sector. The results show that both
the traditional gravity and the extended gravity forces are important determinants of firms’
decision to access different export markets. In particular, our estimates show that the startup
costs of accessing a new country are significantly determined by the differences between the
characteristics of the new country and those of both the home country and of the countries
to which a firm had previously exported. On the contrary, the fixed costs that a firm must
pay in every continuation year of exporting depend much less on country characteristics.
Although the analysis is rich in many dimensions -notably in its flexibility concerning the
choice set firms face and in the multiple characteristics of destination countries that it takes
into account- it has limitations. The structural model considered places all the extended
gravity effects into sunk costs. In particular, it assumes that the variable costs of exporting
do not depend on the exporting history of the firm. This is done mainly for computational
reasons. Allowing the variable costs of exporting to depend on extended gravity effects would
imply that the potential gross profits from exporting to any given country cannot be computed
independently of the set of countries to which the firm is effectively exporting. Therefore, the
solution of the model would be more complicated.
38Due to the existence of country-specific entry costs, the decision to export to a given country in a given
period affects the following period’s export profits in the same country. Therefore, this entry decision cannot
be analyzed as a static optimization problem.
39Due to the existence of extended gravity effects, the decision to export to a given country in a given period
may affect the net profits of exporting to any other country with whom it shares an extended gravity effect.
Therefore, the decision to export to a given country cannot be analyzed independently of the decision to serve
other countries that are related to it through some extended gravity variable.
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Another limitation of the model is the absence of structural errors. Although this paper
is the first one to allow for expectational errors in the analysis of dynamic discrete choice
problems through moment inequalities, it still has the limitation that it leaves out structural
errors. In particular, it does not consider firm-country specific factors that influence entry
and exit decisions but are not in the data. If these unobservable factors tend to be correlated
across countries that are connected in our setting through some extended gravity variable,
then our estimates might not be capturing state dependence in trade costs but rather the
effect of unobserved heterogeneity in country specific potential export profits40.
Finally, this paper brings up the question of how important extended gravity effects are
in the determination of aggregate trade flows. On the one hand, previous studies have shown
that there is a great deal of dynamics in firms’ export relations that washes out at a more
aggregate level (see Buono et al. (2008)). Yet, on the other hand, Eaton et al. (2008) show
that entry and exit into exporting has an important effect on aggregate trade flows in the long
term, with successful entrants accounting for almost half of total export expansion during
their first ten years of exporting. Determining the effect of extended gravity variables on
aggregate trade flows therefore boils down to analyzing to what extent firms that benefit from
these effects are likely to succeed in their export activity.
40Morales (2010) studies the identification problem of state dependence vs. heterogeneity in this setting and
allows for a particular set of structural errors in the estimation of trade costs.
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Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof of Proposition 1 comes directly from Assumption 1. From equation (9) we know
that:
Ei[piiotot−1t + δpiiot+1ott+1 + ωiot+1t+2|Jit] ≥ Ei[piio′tot−1t + δpiio′t+1o′tt+1 + ωio′t+1t+2|Jit],
with
ot+1 = argmax
bt+1∈Biott+1
Ei
[
Πibt+1ott+1|Jit+1
]
,
and
o′t+1 = argmax
bt+1∈Bio′tt+1
Ei
[
Πibt+1o′tt+1|Jit+1
]
.
By transitivity of preferences,
Ei[piiotot−1t + δpiiot+1ott+1 + ωiot+1t+2|Jit] ≥ Ei[piio′tot−1t + δpiiot+1o′tt+1 + ωiot+1t+2|Jit],
where ot+1 is a random variable whose realization is still unknown in period t. Canceling
terms on both sides:
Ei[piiotot−1t + δpiiot+1ott+1|Jit] ≥ Ei[piio′tot−1t + δpiiot+1o′tt+1|Jit]. Q.E.D.
A.2 Identifying Observations: Additional Examples
Here we present additional examples of how to build inequalities that identify the bounds of
each of our parameters. We focus on the parameters µS0 (constant term in the country-specific
sunk costs of exporting), µFl (gravity term corresponding to language entering the fixed costs
of exporting), and µSl (gravity term corresponding to language entering the sunk costs of
exporting).
A.2.1 Additional Example 1: Bounding µS0
Imagine we observe firm i with the following stream of gross profits in country j and an
associated export trajectory
Year 1 2 3 4 5
Profits vij1 vij2 vij3 vij4 vij5
Exports 0 1 0 0 0
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A counterfactual that is going to help us identify an upper bound for µS0 is:
Year 1 2 3 4 5
Actual 0 1 0 0 0
Counterfactual 0 0 0 0 0
where we eliminate the entry event. Assume for simplicity that country j shares the same
continent, language, and GDP per capita group with Chile, meaning that the gravity variables
for these characteristics appearing in the fixed and sunk cost terms take a value of 0. Then,
as long as firm i was exporting to some other country j′ in periods 1 or 2 and to no country
in periods 3 and later, our counterfactual generates the following difference in profits:
piido32 = vij2 − µF0 − µS0 − Fij2 − Sij2
which immediately generates an observation for the upper bound of the sum of µF0 and µ
S
0 .
This example shows that, while the parameter µF0 might appear in some moments indepen-
dently of µS0 (see Section 5.1.1), µ
S
0 will never appear without µ
F
0 . Therefore, the identification
of bounds for µS0 relies on additional moments like the ones described in Section 5.1.1. As an
example:
µF0 + µ
S
0 ≤ vij2 − Fij2 − Sij2
µF0 ≥ vi′j′4 − Fi′j′4
jointly imply:
µS0 ≤ vij2 − Fij2 − Sij2 − (vi′j′4 − Fi′j′4)
which gives an observation for the upper bound of µS0 . Note that i
′ might be different from i,
j′ might be different from j, or both.
The procedure to identify a lower bound for µS0 is analogous. It is obtained by combining
a lower bound on the sum of µS0 and µ
F
0 with an upper bound on µ
F
0 .
The examples shown here so far, as well as the ones presented in Section 5, are simple
cases compared to those that might appear in the data. In general, multiple parameters will
appear in the same moment (see Tables 5 and A.3). We progressively complicate the example
above to show how more parameters might appear in the same moment inequality:
• Complication 1: add the assumption that firm i is not exporting to any other country
other than j at period 1 nor at period 2. In this case, firm i needs to pay the basic costs
of exporting when exporting to j at period 2.
piido32 = vij2 − µF0 − µS0 − µB0 − Fij2 − Sij2 − Bi2
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• Complication 2: add to complication 1 the assumption that country j does not share
continent, official language nor GDP per capita group with Chile.
piido32 = vij2 − µF0 − µFc − µFl − µFgdp − µS0 − µSc − µSl − µSgdp − µB0 − Fij2 − Sij2 − Bi2
• Complication 3: add to complications 1 and 2 the assumption that firm i was actually
exporting to country j at periods 2 and 3 (i.e. not only at period 2). In this case, actual
and counterfactual strategies become:
Year 1 2 3 4 5
Actual 0 1 1 0 0
Counterfactual 0 0 1 0 0
and the resulting moment difference in profits is:
piido32 = vij2 − µF0 − µFc − µFl − µFgdp − (1− δ)(µS0 + µSc + µSl + µSgdp + µB0 )− Fij2 − Sij2
+ δSij3 − Bi2 + δBi3
• Complication 4: add to complications 1, 2, and 3 the assumption that firm i starts ex-
porting at period 3 to some other foreign country j′ that shares continent, and language
with country j. The final difference in profits is:
piido32 = vij2 − µF0 − µFc − µFl − µFgdp − (1− δ)(µS0 + µSc + µSl + µSgdp) + δ(ζSc + ζSl )− Fij2
− Sij2 + δSij3 − Bi2 + δBi3
A.2.2 Additional Example 2: Bounding µFl
Consider a situation in which firm i is exporting in year 7 to countries j and j′. While country
j has Spanish as official language, country j′ does not. However, neither country j nor j′ are
located in South America or belong to the same GDP per capita group as Chile. Firm i exits
country j in period 8 while it keeps exporting to country j′ for, at least, two additional years.
Specifically, assume the stream of profits and actual export strategies implemented in each
country j and j′ are:
Year 7 8 9
Country j
Profits vij7 vij8 vij9
Exports 1 1 1
Country j′
Profits vij′7 vij′8 vij′9
Exports 1 0 0
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A possible counterfactual that implements one-period deviations would be:
Year 7 8 9
Actual
Country j 1 1 1
Country j′ 1 0 0
Counterfactual
Country j 1 0 1
Country j′ 1 1 0
Assuming that firm i does not export to any other country at periods 8 and 9, the difference
in profits linked to this particular deviation at period 8 is:
piido98 = vij8 − vij′8 + µFl + δ(µS0 + µSc + µSgdp)− (Fij8 − Fij′8) + δSij9
Note that the counterfactual strategy implies that firm i needs to reenter country j at period
9 and, therefore, pay the corresponding sunk cost of exporting. If the actual strategy implied
firm i exiting country j at period 9 (i.e. firm i exports to country j only in years 7 and 8),
then the inequality simplifies to:
piido98 = vij8 − vij′8 + µFl − (Fij8 − Fij′8)
The same intuition outlined here applies when we are looking for observations that identify
bounds for µFc and µ
F
gdp.
A.2.3 Additional Example 3: Bounding µSl
Assume the same countries j and j′ from the example above for µFl . However, instead of the
previous strategies, we assume that firm i applies the following export strategies in these two
countries:
Year 7 8 9
Country j
Profits vij7 vij8 vij9
Exports 0 1 0
Country j′
Profits vij′7 vij′8 vij′9
Exports 0 0 0
The deviation that we implement yields:
Year 7 8 9
Actual
Country j 0 1 0
Country j′ 0 0 0
Counterfactual
Country j 0 0 0
Country j′ 0 1 0
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Assuming that neither country j nor country j′ benefit from extended gravity effects at period
8 and that firm i does not export to any country at period 9, we obtain the following difference
in profits:
piido98 = vij′8 − vij8 − µFl − µSl + Fij8 − Fij′8 + Sij8 − Sij′8
Applying the same logic indicated above for µS0 , we need to combine this inequality with a
upper bound on µFl in order to really obtain a lower bound for µ
S
l .
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Figures and Tables
Table 1: Export volumes
Year Export Export Prop.
Volume Growth Exports
S.24 S.24 S.24
1996 435 0.0 6.8
1997 653 50.1 9.6
1998 561 28.9 8.4
1999 636 46.2 8.9
2000 1,042 139.6 13.1
2001 1,154 165.0 14.5
2002 1,114 155.9 13.7
2003 1,538 253.3 16.4
2004 1,825 319.2 15.5
2005 2,421 456.3 17.5
Notes: Export volumes are in millions of cur-
rent US dollars. Export growth shows per-
centage change in export volumes with re-
spect to year 1996. The proportion of exports
is the percentage of aggregate manufacturing
exports.
Table 2: Summary statistics (Sector 24)
N Mean S.D. Min p25 p50 p75 Max
Dom. sales (exp) F-Y 1420 44.48 256.95 0.03 1.98 6.01 17.86 6792.19
Dom. sales (nonexp) F-Y 670 1.94 2.82 0.02 0.46 0.90 2.29 21.05
Value exported F-Y-C 6253 1.39 8.02 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.41 272.89
Value exported F-Y 1031 8.43 43.53 0.00 0.04 0.27 1.88 608.42
Value exported F 142 61.22 303.83 0.00 0.06 1.06 8.71 2761.67
N. countries served F-Y 1031 6.06 6.47 1 2 4 8 35
N. countries served F 142 9.96 10.26 1 2 7 14 56
N. entries (countries) F-Y 1425 1.38 1.65 0 0 1 2 13
N. entries (exporting) F 95 0.67 0.74 0 0 1 1 3
N. exists (countries) F-Y 1042 1.01 1.50 0 0 0 2 10
N. exists (exporting) F 82 0.58 0.81 0 0 0 1 3
Notes: Export volumes and domestic sales are in millions of year 2000 US dollars. The distribution of the different
variables is computed across firms that export at least once during the sample period. F stands for firm; Y stands
for year; and C stands for country.
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Table 3: Transition matrices for extended gravity variables (Sector 24)
Conditional on t− 1 Conditional on t
Action in t
All Countries but South American Entry No Entry Entry No Entry
Options Relative Shares Continent 0.035 0.965 0.598 0.186
to t− 1 Bundle Does Not 0.006 0.994 0.402 0.814
All Countries but Spanish Speaking Entry No Entry Entry No Entry
Options Relative Shares Language 0.024 0.976 0.368 0.203
to t− 1 Bundle Does Not 0.009 0.991 0.634 0.797
All Countries but Up Mid. Income Entry No Entry Entry No Entry
Options Relative Shares Income Group 0.021 0.979 0.759 0.480
to t− 1 Bundle Does Not 0.005 0.995 0.241 0.520
All Countries but Bordering Chile Entry No Entry Entry No Entry
Options Relative Shares Border 0.075 0.925 0.474 0.009
to t− 1 Bundle Does Not 0.009 0.991 0.526 0.991
Notes: All the firms considered in this table were exporting in period t− 1. The rows differentiate between
firms exporting to some country that shares the corresponding characteristic with the destination country
and the remaining exporting firms. The columns differentiate between computing probabilities conditional
on the state in period t− 1 (left panel) or conditional on the behavior in period t (right panel).
Table 4: Transition matrices for extended gravity variables (Sector 24)
Conditional on t− 2 Conditional on t
Action in t
All Countries but South American Entry No Entry Entry No Entry
Options Relative Shares Continent 0.010 0.990 0.126 0.006
to t− 2 Bundle Does Not 0.005 0.995 0.874 0.994
All Countries but Spanish Speaking Entry No Entry Entry No Entry
Options Relative Shares Language 0.010 0.990 0.082 0.068
to t− 2 Bundle Does Not 0.008 0.992 0.918 0.934
All Countries but Up Mid. Income Entry No Entry Entry No Entry
Options Relative Shares Income Group 0.006 0.994 0.202 0.150
to t− 2 Bundle Does Not 0.004 0.996 0.898 0.850
All Countries but Bordering Chile Entry No Entry Entry No Entry
Options Relative Shares Border 0.032 0.968 0.117 0.028
to t− 2 Bundle Does Not 0.007 0.993 0.883 0.972
Notes: All the firms considered in this table were exporting in period t − 2 and are not exporting to a
country that shares the corresponding characteristic with the destination country in period t− 1. The rows
differentiate between firms exporting in t− 2 to some country that shares the corresponding characteristic
with the destination country and the remaining exporting firms. The columns differentiate between com-
puting probabilities conditional on the state in period t − 2 (left panel) or conditional on the behavior in
period t (right panel).
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Table 6: Estimated set and confidence intervals for single parameters
(Sector 24 - narrow version)
(Including moment inequality 6 in Table 5)
Parameter Estimate PPHI Correlation
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
µE0 0 199,046 0 748,310 0 393,870
µS0 57,218 77,688 0 121,550 292 190,330
µF0 215,785 235,577 2,185 264,230 173,070 266,550
µFc 0 11,506 0 37,999 0 61,867
µFl 0 24,505 0 69,567 0 93,786
µFgdp 0 12,105 0 39,578 0 58,292
µSc 6,902 68,695 0 133,010 0 200,070
µSl 0 109,978 0 153,540 0 181,690
µSgdp 35,540 87,339 0 140,070 0 167,190
ζSc 0 24,741 0 131,040 0 171,970
ζSl 0 171,929 0 213,730 0 210,300
ζSgdp 0 18,320 0 103,040 0 112,810
ζSb 0 20,558 0 89,670 0 80,504
Notes: Values are in year 2000 USD. For each parameter, the first row contains the
inner confidence interval and the second one the outer confidence interval. In both
cases, they are 90% intervals computed with 1,000 simulations. The confidence
intervals that account for correlation across observations have been computed using
1,000 subsamples.
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Table 8: Decomposing Trade Costs
(Sector 24 - narrow version)
(Including moment inequality 6 in Table 5)
If the firm at t If the firm at t-1
exports to. . . exported to. . . Basic Fixed Sunk Ext.Grav. % Ext.Grav.
US
US 0 233,168 0 0 0
Canada 0 233,168 186,704 43,385 18.86
Mexico 0 233,168 226,152 3,937 1.72
UK 0 233,168 186,704 43,385 18.86
Colombia 0 233,168 230,089 0 0
Chile 55,824 233,168 230,089 0 0
Spain
Spain 0 226,172 0 0 0
France 0 226,172 162,411 0 0
Colombia 0 226,172 162,440 0 0
Chile 65,916 226,172 162,440 0 0
Brazil
Brazil 0 231,140 0 0 0
Argentina 0 231,140 118,589 2,381 1.93
Portugal 0 231,140 85,420 35,920 29.61
Ecuador 0 231,140 121,340 0 0
Chile 74,658 231,140 121,340 0 0
Colombia
Colombia 0 225,682 0 0 0
Venezuela 0 225,682 63,187 6,391 9.19
Argentina 0 225,682 69,578 0 0
Chile 84,276 225,682 69,578 0 0
Notes: Values are in year 2000 USD. The estimates shown in this table correspond to a model that
does not censor exports at any lower bound. Columns 3 to 8 are computed using the predicted profits
from the first stage for the corresponding destination country and the midpoints for the constant costs
arising from the intervals whose lower and upper bound are shown in columns 1 and 4.
51
Additional Figures and Tables
Table A.1: First Stage Regression
Sector 24 Sector 24 Sector 24
Noncens. ≥ 1, 000 ≥ 5, 000
lrevijt
ldomsalesit 0.431∗∗∗ 0.418∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.039) (0.033)
propskillit −0.427∗∗∗ −0.249∗ 0.156
(0.150) (0.142) (0.131)
lavgwageit 0.322∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.074) (0.066)
lavgvalueaddit −0.140∗∗∗ −0.120∗∗∗ −0.134∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.054) (0.042)
borderjt 0.409∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.081) (0.075)
contjt 0.134 0.127 0.119
(0.084) (0.079) (0.074)
langjt −0.198∗ −0.198∗∗ −0.071
(0.103) (0.098) (0.095)
gdppcjt 0.179∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.068) (0.064) (0.061)
lgdpjt 0.250∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.021) (0.020)
avglrerj −0.103∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗ −0.078∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
devlrerjt 0.610∗∗∗ 0.562∗∗∗ 0.245
(0.259) (0.245) (0.229)
legalj −0.069∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.019) (0.017)
Obs. 6,253 6,098 5,575
Notes: * denotes 10% significance, ** denotes 5% significance,
*** denotes 1% significance. Robust standard errors are in paren-
theses. The dependent variable is log revenue. Year fixed effects
are included. Columns 2 and 3 only consider observations with
export revenues above 1, 000 USD and 5, 000 USD, respectively.
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Table A.2: Estimated set and confidence intervals for single parameters
(Sector 24 - narrow version)
(Not including moment inequality 6 in Table 5)
Parameter Estimate PPHI Correlation
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
µE0 0 199,046 0 1,236,000 0 1,213,600
µS0 57,218 77,688 31,417 137,990 292 191,050
µF0 215,785 235,577 186,960 271,610 173,070 269,600
µFc 0 11,506 0 43,406 0 61,867
µFl 0 24,505 0 70,869 0 93,786
µFgdp 0 12,105 0 44,887 0 58,292
µSc 6,902 68,695 0 148,970 0 181,690
µSl 0 109,978 0 165,400 0 184,741
µSgdp 35,540 87,339 0 163,580 0 184,340
ζSc 0 24,741 0 154,120 0 171,970
ζSl 0 171,929 0 232,060 0 220,340
ζSgdp 0 18,320 0 103,040 0 112,810
ζSb 0 20,558 0 100,430 0 80,502
Notes: Values are in year 2000 USD. For each parameter, the first row contains the
inner confidence interval and the second one the outer confidence interval. In both
cases, they are 90% intervals computed with 1,000 simulations. The confidence
intervals that account for correlation across observations have been computed using
1,000 subsamples.
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Table A.4: Estimated set and confidence intervals for single parameters
(Sector 24 - wide version)
(Including moment inequality 6 in Table A.3)
Parameter Estimate PPHI Correlation
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
µE0 0 274,410 0 1,425,600 0 490,620
µS0 9,703 88,320 0 151,560 0 163,790
µF0 203,390 273,340 0 309,100 145,500 300,040
µFc 0 27,706 0 55,022 0 85,955
µFl 0 61,210 0 121,920 0 162,610
µFgdp 0 50,705 0 101,730 0 136,630
µSc 0 69,133 0 134,020 0 202,910
µSl 0 199,820 0 318,960 0 348,230
µSgdp 0 195,950 0 334,310 0 255,600
ζSc 0 112,040 0 189,860 0 242,590
ζSl 0 242,450 0 365,620 0 277,490
ζSgdp 0 95,989 0 187,110 0 227,300
ζSb 0 81,067 0 125,160 0 89,982
Notes: Values are in year 2000 USD. For each parameter, the first row contains the
inner confidence interval and the second one the outer confidence interval. In both
cases, they are 90% intervals computed with 1,000 simulations. The confidence
intervals that account for correlation across observations have been computed using
1,000 subsamples.
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Table A.6: Decomposing Trade Costs
(Sector 24 - wide version)
(Including moment inequality 6 in Table 5)
If the firm at t If the firm at t-1
exports to. . . exported to. . . Basic Fixed Sunk Ext.Grav. % Ext.Grav.
US
US 0 247,370 0 0 0
Canada 0 247,370 206,675 52,630 20.31
Mexico 0 247,370 240,970 18,335 7.07
UK 0 247,370 214,535 43,385 17.27
Colombia 0 247,370 259,305 0 0
Chile 23,600 247,370 259,305 0 0
Spain
Spain 0 240,675 0 0 0
France 0 240,675 187,040 3,010 1.58
Colombia 0 240,675 190,050 0 0
Chile 47,325 240,675 190,050 0 0
Brazil
Brazil 0 238,365 0 0 0
Argentina 0 238,365 129,610 13,570 9.48
Portugal 0 238,365 127,860 15,320 10.70
Ecuador 0 238,365 143,180 0 0
Chile 75,300 238,365 143,180 0 0
Colombia
Colombia 0 238,365 0 0 0
Venezuela 0 238,365 32,460 11,030 25.36
Argentina 0 238,365 43,490 0 0
Chile 110,950 238,365 43,490 0 0
Notes: Values are in year 2000 USD. The estimates shown in this table correspond to a model that
does not censor exports at any lower bound. Columns 3 to 8 are computed using the predicted profits
from the first stage for the corresponding destination country and the midpoints for the constant costs
arising from the intervals whose lower and upper bound are shown in columns 1 and 4.
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